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Demographic Determinants of Savings: Estimating and Interpreting
the Aggregate Association in Asia
T. Paul Schultz
Abstract
Life cycle savings is proposed as one explanation for much of the increase in savings and economic
growth in Asia.  The association between the age composition of a nation’s population and its
savings rate, observed within 16 Asian countries from 1952 to 1992, is reestimated here to be less
than a quarter the size reported in a seminal study, which assumed lagged savings is exogenous.
Specification tests as well as common sense imply, moreover, that lagged savings is likely to be
endogenous, and when estimated accordingly there remains no significant dependence of savings
on the age composition, measured in several ways.  Research should consider lifetime savings as a
substitute for children, and model the causes for the decline in fertility which changes the age
compositions and could thereby account for savings and growth in Asia.
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1. Introduction 
The age composition of a country=s population may be associated with its saving rate, and may therefore 
have consequences for its economic growth.  One explanation for such an association is that the savings rate 
tends to be relatively high for a birth cohort when it experiences its peak earnings, and relatively low when a 
cohort anticipates relatively low earnings, such as during retirement.  Variations in the age composition of a 
population may then determine variations in national savings rates, over time and across countries, holding 
other things equal. This life cycle savings hypothesis is intuitively appealing, and economists and demographers 
have explored the theoretical and empirical implications of the hypothesis following Modigliani and Brumberg 
(1954). This paper reexamines this empirical association within Asian countries, where the changing age 
compositions has been attributed a central role in the recent increase in savings and economic growth (e.g. 
Higgins and Williamson, 1996, 1997).  The estimated magnitude of this dynamic aggregate relationship  
appears to be smaller  than reported, and sensitive to the choice of econometric methods used to describe it.  
Moreover, studies of savings behavior at the household level do not find sufficient life cycle variations in 
savings to account for these purported aggregate relationships.  Are there alternative explanations for the trends 
in savings?  The substitution of savings for children is one possible explanation for these empirical regularities, 
which could be explained within a household lifetime demand framework.     
 
2. Models of Savings Associated with the Age Composition 
Modigliani and Brumburg (1954) (hereafter MB) assume in their life cycle (LC) model that individuals 
maximize lifetime utility by allocating lifetime discounted income to consumption in various periods of the life 
cycle by using capital markets, to equalize the discounted marginal utility of consumption in each period, 
assuming diminishing marginal utility of consumption in each period.  Friedman=s (1957) permanent income 
hypothesis shares many of the same features, emphasizing also smoothing of consumption from Atransitory 
variation@ in realized income.  Browning and Lusardi (1996) characterize both approaches within a common 
certainty equivalence model, because they both rely on an inter-temporally additive utility function and a capital 
market, from which predictions are derived for short-run and long-run consumption-smoothing behavior. 
Browning and Lusardi note, however, the popularity of this model of consumption behavior should not blind us 
to the many empirical studies which fail to confirm the importance of the life cycle motivation for consumption 
smoothing behavior in high- and low-income countries.  
 
There are no children in the LC model; the individual enters the model as an adult at the Abeginning of 
the earnings span@ and Areceives utility only from present and prospective consumption and from assets@ (MB, 




death, the timing of which involves no uncertainty.  MB explicitly assume that Athe typical household does not 
inherit assets to any significant extent and does not plan on leaving assets to heirs@, and they thereby set aside 
intergenerational transfers or bequests, avoiding explicit recognition of children, marriage, household  
formation, or labor supply choices.  The adult individual earner eventually retires and over her or his life cycle 
has zero present discounted savings.  With no population or income growth in a steady state, aggregate savings 
is also zero, but savings will tend to rise if the population increases and/or income per capita grows.   
 
Demographers modified this LC scheme by introducing an early life-cycle stage of dependency which 
could depress public as well as private savings.  In other words, childhood as well as retirement is added to the 
life cycle.  The demographic transition in a country such as India B when mortality and fertility rates decline B 
affects promptly the fraction of children in the population, but only impacts substantially the fraction of elderly 
after a time, because much of the early decline in mortality occurs as infants and children survive in greater 
numbers (Coale and Hoover, 1958).  According to recent restatements of this framework called the 
“demographic dividend”, a rapid demographic transition facilitates a large increase in the rate of national 
savings after a decade or two, followed by a gradual peaking in savings and then an expected decline in the rate 
of saving  after four or more decades, as an increasing share of the population retires (e.g. Higgins and 
Williamson, 1996; Bloom and Williamson, 1998; Mason, 2001; Birdsall et al, 2001). 
 
Economists have also extended the LC model to link micro behavior to aggregate growth dynamics. 
Tobin (1967) portrayed more realistically than MB how the ratio of savings to income and the ratio of wealth to 
income would evolve.  His goal was to assess whether the life cycle savings hypothesis could account for the 
observed wealth and savings outcomes in a setting such as the United States in the 1960s.  Tobin allowed for a 
Apositive interest rate, probabilistic life span, empirically calibrated income profiles for men and women, and 
added childhood as well as old age (i.e. two periods of dependency with dissaving), with a changing family 
structure@ over the life cycle, by allowing the age and sex composition of a representative household in a birth 
cohort to change as the household=s head ages. Tobin then describes Agolden-age@ growth paths for savings and 
wealth ratios determined by specified values for the rate of interest, rates of growth of population, and rates of 
growth of per capita income.  But this more detailed empirical calibration still assumes fertility and family 
formation are not coordinated decisions but are determined exogenously from outside of the savings model.  
Coale and Hoover (1958) also demographically assume mortality and fertility occur independently of life cycle 
savings behavior.  The problem with all of these frameworks is that they view fertility as fixed from outside of 
the model and thus not a resource-constrained lifetime choice.  If fertility is allowed to be jointly determined 
with savings and female labor supply, the implications of the life cycle model for the pattern of income, 





The relationship between children and savings is not resolved in theoretical terms and is relatively 
unexplored in empirical work at either the aggregate or family level.  Children are widely thought to function as 
an intertemporal investment, or a mechanism for transferring resources over the life cycle of parents from a 
period of relatively high adult productivity to a period of relatively low productivity in old age. In this case, it is 
reasonable to expect children to substitute, to some degree, for monetized savings that accomplish the same 
ends for parents.  When parents decide to reduce their lifetime fertility, the scarcity or marginal value to them of 
other forms of savings and wealth is likely to increase, other things being equal. Samuelson (1958) concluded 
parents are  motivated to have children in part by the expectation that their children will help support and care 
for them in old age.  This essential function of the family has given rise to an extensive literature of overlapping 
generations models of savings, intergenerational transfers, and growth.  An Aexogenous@ reduction in fertility 
would motivate parents to substitute more of their resources into savings and wealth accumulation in other 
forms for their old age support. Unless additional assumptions are made, however, it is unclear how an 
Aendogenous@ declines in fertility would Aimpact@ parent savings and accumulation of a portfolio of wealth, 
without also modeling the determination of fertility.  
 
If a primary reason for adults to have children is to assure for their consumption and care in retirement 
and during periods of disability -- a form of social insurance as well as savings -- smaller family sizes might be 
expected to boost parent savings rates out of lifetime income and increase the demands of parents for public and 
private pensions.  When parents decide to reduce their fertility, their savings rates should then increase, other 
things equal.  But the changed environment which led them to restrict their fertility may have increased or 
decreased their lifetime wealth, and thereby affected how much they want to consume and save, or  the relative 
returns to saving in the form of human capital, land and other physical assets.  From the children=s perspective, 
their motivation to save to provide for the consumption and care of their parents when the parents are old will 
also be intensified by the parent’s decision to reduce their fertility, leaving any burden of parent support to a 
smaller number of offspring.1  
 
Becker (1981) hypothesized that the quantity of children and the quality of children, proxied by the 
human capital invested in each child, are viewed by parents as substitute objectives.  If quantity and quality of 
children are indeed substitutes, this would help to account for a negative covariation between fertility and the 
savings of parents allocated to investment in human capital per child (Schultz, 1981, 2002).  But does the 
                                                           
1  Children who have benefited from their parents= growing investment in their human capital may also be more likely to 
honor the implicit intergenerational annuity contract for supporting elderly parent, unless pensions and medical care for the elderly   are 




substitution of quality for quantity of children fully offset the decline in number of children during the 
demographic transition and lead parents to increase their lifetime savings as the demographic transition 
proceeds? Evidence is scarce.  If fertility declines by more than half, as we have seen widely in the world, 
parents would have to more than double their investments per child in human capital to achieve an absolute rise 
in this form of savings per parent.  Jorgenson (1995) treats parent investments in children as Asavings@ in his 
national accounts, and by his reckoning there has been an increase in the household savings rate for investment 
in children in the United States in the 20th century.  But such comprehensive measures of household savings that 
includes household production of child human capital are not a standard convention of national accounts, and 
thus they are not available for study in other countries. 
 
The LC model assumes that children do not influence wealth accumulation.  This appears implausible to 
me, even if the sign and magnitude of the cross effect depends on unknown underlying parameters and 
controversial modeling assumptions (Browning, 1992). There is evidence, however, that unanticipated variation 
in fertility affects female labor supply, and thus market income over the life cycle (Rosenzweig and Wolpin, 
1980b), and it affects investment in human capital per child and probably household total savings (Rosenzweig 
and Wolpin, 1980a; Rosenzweig and Schultz, 1987).  Consequently, I expect that in the last 40 years as fertility 
has fallen rapidly in East, Southeast, and then South Asia (Figure 1), household savings rates increased among 
later-born generations of parents as their lifetime fertility declined.  This occurred more gradually when fertility 
declined in the 19th Century United States (Lewis, 1983). 
 
There are thus two basic models that imply different mechanisms linking the decline in fertility to the 
rise in aggregate savings rates.  The first LC model assumes that the age profile of savings rates motivated by 
retirement operates uniformly across birth cohorts in a society, holding constant lifetime income. If  the 
proportion of the population in the dependent ages decreases  -- younger than say 20 and older than 60 --  
aggregate savings rates will tend to increase.  Thus, during the demographic transition as fertility declines, the 
decrease in the proportion of the population in the youth-dependent category outweighs the small increase in 
the proportion of the population in the elderly-dependent category, and aggregate savings rates will tend to 
increase for at least a decade or two, other things being equal.  About forty years after a steep decline in 
fertility, the dependency rate starts to increase as the growth in the elderly proportion of the population 
outweighs any further decline in the proportion of dependent youth. The pace of the transition and precise path 
of birth and age-specific death rates will determine how soon and how severely the country encounters the 
eventual savings shortfall associated with an aging population (See Figures 2).  Taxes and transfers may 
mitigate the economic and social problems associated with an aging population B  by providing pensions and 




and by regulating the level and composition of immigration to increase the share of workers in the population 
(e.g. Heller, 2003). 
 
The second model considers the household as demanding (HD) children and other consumption goods 
over a lifetime, and couples modify their choices because of changes in prices, wages, returns on wealth, and 
technological opportunities.  If parents view their demand for precautionary and retirement wealth as a 
substitute for children, cohorts who are born later and have begun to reduce their fertility for a variety of 
reasons will also increase their savings. Investment by households in the health and schooling of their children 
may also increase, which may spur growth and improve the well being of the population. 
 
How do the Life Cycle and Household Demand Models of Savings Differ? 
The aggregate trends in age composition and savings accounted for by the LC model are also consistent 
with the HD model of lifetime fertility and wealth accumulation.  I know of no empirical studies that assess 
which framework better explains the historical record (Heller, 2003).  In the LC model the key concept is the 
profile of savings by age, motivated by retirement, whereas the HD model extends the framework to account for 
a variety of household lifetime behaviors, and thus allows more incentives for households to have children and 
to save in the various forms of assets.  
 
In a general equilibrium framework, an exogenous increase in the aggregate supply of savings should 
diminish the returns to savings and thus curb the supply of savings. If the economy is open to world capital 
markets, the effect of the domestic savings supply on returns would be moderated.  As countries experience 
major changes in their age composition due to the timing and pace of their demographic transition, international 
capital flows may respond accordingly (Taylor and Williamson, 1994).  Higgins and Williamson (1996, 1997) 
(hereafter HW) estimate jointly the equations for aggregate savings rates and aggregate investment rates, 
presumably allowing omitted variables to affect errors in both the savings and investment equations.  In their 
linear specification, any difference between the effect of the age composition on aggregate savings and on 
investments is equal to the effect of the age composition on the current account surplus (or deficit if negative) in 
an internationally open economy.  HW expect the age composition of the population to affect aggregate 
domestic investment opportunities, leading investment rates to peak when a population is concentrated in 
younger adult ages, whereas savings rates peak for somewhat older workers who are at their peak earnings.  An 
economy open to international capital flows will therefore be inclined to borrow from abroad when it has a 
youthful age composition which creates a domestic shortage of savings relative to investment opportunities.  
Conversely, a country will tend to export its surplus savings when it has a disproportionate share of its 




and Russia during the period 1870-1910, and some view this as an international intergenerational transfer, and 
explain it in terms of differences in age structures as they do the swings in current account balances from 
negative to positive from 1960-2000 in Japan, Singapore, Taiwan, and Korea (Taylor and Williamson, 1994, 
HW, 1996: Table 4).2 
 
One possible way to distinguish between the LC and HD models is to see whether different observable 
exogenous causes for the decline in fertility exert different Across-effects@ on savings, as might be expected 
within the HD model. Different causes for the same fertility changes would have the same effect on the age 
composition and would be indistinguishable in the LC model of savings.3   The rise in the opportunity cost of 
children due to the rise in women=s wage opportunities outside of the family may have reduced the demand for 
children and contributed to the secular decline in birth rates (Mincer, 1963; Schultz, 1981, 2002).  The increase 
in the returns to child human capital may also have led parents to substitute child quality for the number of 
children parents demand (Becker, 1981). The new technological options for birth control (i.e. the oral steroid 
pill and the IUD) spread through the world after the 1960s and decreased the cost of birth control, encouraging 
fertility to decline.    
 
Population policies which subsidize a voluntary fertility decline are expected to have a smaller effect on 
savings than an equally effective fertility-rationing scheme, such as the birth quota (i.e. one-child family) 
adopted in China after 1970.  Although both voluntary reproductive choices and birth quotas might achieve the 
same magnitude of decline in fertility, in perhaps Hong Kong, Taiwan and China, the impact on savings from 
China=s policy of birth quotas would presumably be larger, if savings and children are substitutes.  Tobin and 
Houthtakker (1950-51) demonstrate that rationing causes a larger cross-commodity shift in household demands 
toward substitutes in the HD model, but this would not be expected in the LC model that implicitly assumes 
children and savings are independent choices.  Even though the birth quota may have stimulated savings, it also 
must have sacrificed the welfare of the poor rural population, who had their reproductive choices restricted 
without compensation (Schultz, 2004).   Johnson (1999) has argued cogently that there is little empirical or 
theoretical evidence for the belief that reducing Chinese fertility and slowing population growth has fostered 
Chinese development, but it remains unclear whether it could have boosted personal savings. 
 
                                                           
2 Higgins (1998) illustrates how the jointly estimated savings and investment equations are modified when total 
savings and investment are restricted to be equal (i.e. in a closed economy) and when they are permitted to differ (i.e. in an 
open economy).  The age composition effects on savings are estimated to be weaker in the open than in the closed economy, 
as expected from the general equilibrium model.   
 
3  Another way to think of this heterogeneity is in terms of local area treatment estimators (LATE) in which the 




3. Macro and Micro Empirical Evidence of Savings and Aging 
The empirical relationship between age and savings has been studied using a variety of approaches with 
macro data for countries and micro data for households.  This section reviews the findings of some of these 
studies.   Leff (1969) found across 74 countries in 1964 that the log of gross savings rates is inversely related to 
the fraction of the population under age 15, and the fraction over age 64, while controlling for log GDP per 
capita, and log growth of GDP per capita in the previous five years.  However, Leff=s findings were criticized 
because of his handling of the data, specification of his variables, sample composition, and estimation methods. 
Kelley and Schmidt (1996) preserved the simplicity of his approach and corrected many of his problems in their 
later analysis of data for 89 countries for three decades of the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s. They find savings rates 
are higher in countries with higher GDP per capita (not a conclusion of the LC model), with higher growth in 
GDP per capita (implied by LC stable-state and dynamics), and not significantly related to the fraction of youth 
and elderly in 1960s or the 1970s.  However, by the 1980s the fraction of youth and elderly were negatively 
related to the savings rate,  as predicted by the LC model.  Estimates of this ALeff@ model for the pooled three 
cross sections revealed no relation between savings and the relative size of the two dependent age groups in the 
population, whereas when changes over time within country were estimated by including both country fixed-
effects and decade-shifters, the youth fraction is unexpectedly associated with higher savings.4   
 
MB (1954) state that within their framework the effect of age composition on saving is nonlinear and 
varies with income growth.  After adding to the LC model the childhood dependency phase in the life cycle, 
Tobin (1967) simulated the path of aggregate savings, to show its sensitivity to per capita income growth and 
the consumption weights assigned to children.  Fry and Mason (1982) propose an aggregate LC savings model 
which includes an interaction effect between the fraction of dependent youth and growth in income, which is 
expected to depress savings (Mason, 1987).   Kelley and Schmidt (1996) incorporate this feature in their second 
set of regressions by including growth in income, the youth dependency share, and the interaction of the youth 
share and growth variables.5  The estimated savings effect of the interaction of income growth and youth 
                                                                                                                                                                                                       
would differ according to the instruments which modified fertility in the past (Angrist, Imbens and Rubins, 1996). 
4 Kelley and Schmidt  (1996; Table 1) specify their youth variable as the ratio of persons age 0 to 14 to the labor force 
activity age 15-65, and the elderly as the ratio of those over 65 to the labor force age.  They then restrict their sample to only less 
developed countries (LDCs,  n=65), in which case neither the youth nor elderly population fractions is significantly related to savings 
in any of the three decadal cross sections.  
5 The original MB life cycle model did not imply that the fraction of income saved would increase with income per capita as 
Leff and Modigliani specified in their early empirical work across countries.  It is not clear, however, why Kelley and Schmidt (1996) 
exclude the elderly dependent population fraction from their AMason@ model.  A negative correlation between the fraction of youth and 
elderly is likely to influence other estimated coefficients when the elderly fraction is dropped.  Leff (1969; p. 890) noted a weakness of 
his results was the high collinearity between the income and dependency population age fractions, leading to unstable and unreliable 
estimates in his cross-country regressions. Kelley and Schmidt also transform the dependent variable for the savings rate to (1/{1-S/Y}) 
and thereby avoid taking logs of near zero or negative saving rates, one flaw in Leff=s original specification. For the same reason 




dependency is negative in the cross section regression for the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s, and in the pooled and 
country fixed-effect model specifications (Kelley and Schmidt, 1996, Table 2).  When they restrict their sample 
to low income countries (i.e. 56 out of 89 countries), the youth dependency fraction interacted with income 
growth is negatively associated with savings only in the 1980s, and in the pooled and fixed effect specifications. 
Based on this AMason@ model and excluding the effect of the elderly, Kelley and Schmidt conclude 
demographic factors (now only the youth) account for a major portion of changes in savings across countries 
and over time, and appear to be robust across various country samples, model specifications, and estimation 
methods.6 
 
Microeconometric tests of the predictive power of the life cycle framework in accounting for savings 
behavior at the household level had even less success. The correlation of consumption and income is high in 
household surveys across groups of households whose head has the same age, and even within a birth cohort 
followed statistically over time in repeated independently drawn cross sectional surveys.  In other words, 
average consumption does not deviate much from average income across ages.  This micro empirical regularity 
is difficult to account for, because the life cycle savings framework anticipated consumption is displaced from 
periods of expected high income to those with expected low income (Lee and Lapkoff, 1988; Carroll and 
Summers, 1991; Paxson, 1996; Deaton, 1997; Schultz, 1998).  As a consequence, other motivations for savings 
are often advanced to explain household savings data, such as precautionary or buffer-stock savings to insure 
against risks and the uncertainty of the individual=s lifetime, and the desire of the elderly to leave a bequest to 
heirs (Browning and Lusardi, 1996; Deaton, 1997).   
 
A possible explanation for the small magnitude of micro-empirical estimates of life cycle savings is 
because age is measured by the age of the head of household, and individuals who are not heads (or spouse of 
heads) are not the focus of analyses of life cycle savings behavior.  If the young and old who are most likely to 
be dissaving are not observed to be household heads because they live in their parents’ or children’s household, 
respectively, the convexity of the savings rate profile with respect to age may be underestimated.  Although the 
likelihood of being a head of household may be close to one from age 30 to 50, it will be far below one among 
younger and older persons on whom any test of the life cycle savings hypothesis critically depends (Schultz, 
1999).7    
                                                           
6  In a cross-country study of 36 primarily high-income countries, Modigliani compared estimates of the LC and 
Keynesian models of savings.  Because the countries did not correspond with the steady-state equilibria described by his 
model, he represented the effect of population growth on savings by the population shares of youth and elderly, which were 
associated with lower savings rates. 
 
7 For example, in 1976 in Taiwan only one in four individuals age 20-24 were heads of their own household or spouse of the 





If wealth income of an individual increases his or her likelihood of being a household head, but does not 
otherwise affect the savings rate, the savings equation can then be estimated, correcting for the unrepresentative 
character of the sample of household heads, and the sample selection model is identified by this exclusion 
restriction.  In Taiwan in 1967 and 1995 the young who are heads of their own households have significantly 
more wealth income  than would be expected of the average young person.  Among the elderly over age 59, 
those who are heads of their household also have greater than average wealth income for their age, and 
expected to save a more substantial share of their income than those who are younger.  In other words,  
correcting for the sample selection bias of being a head of household across age groups suggests that the 
implicit savings behavior of the young is lower than observed which would be consistent with the life cycle 
hypothesis, possibly even borrowing from their parents or credit institutions.  But the sample selection 
correction does not modify much the implicit savings behavior of the elderly, who continue to save a positive 
fraction of their income, which seems to contradict the simple LC hypothesis (Browning and Lusardi, 1996).  
Indirect standardization for the age composition of persons who are not the heads of their own household leads 
to a similar conclusion (Deaton and Paxson, 1997).  In conclusion, the micro household studies of savings have 
not found evidence consistent with the large negative aggregate association reported between the share of youth 
and elderly in a nation and the national savings rate (Mason, 2001). 
 
Data Differences between Savings in Household Surveys and National Income Accounts 
Savings measured in household surveys and as derived in national accounts might differ, possibly 
explaining why micro econometric evidence on savings is not consistent with macro evidence on life cycle 
savings.  First, savings in national accounts generally includes savings of private enterprises which may not 
be reported in household surveys as savings.  The surplus or deficit on government accounts is also 
included in national account savings, but is not included in household savings. These non- household 
sources of output and savings might grow (or decline) as a fraction of income/output with development, as 
the share of employment in the formal and government sectors increases and the share of employment in 
family enterprises decreases.  But it is unclear whether these additions to private household survey savings 
tend to raise the level of national account savings compared with survey savings or change the trend with 
development.   
 
Second, household surveys often underestimate personal income, compared with estimates derived 
                                                                                                                                                                                                       
geographical mobility in Taiwan twenty years later in 1995 only one in six of those 20-24 were heads, and almost half of those age 65-




from national accounts. One argument for relying on the sum of total household expenditures and imputed 
services from consumer durables as a more reliable survey-based measure of household welfare than survey 
reports of income is that expenditures are reported more completely because the typical survey devotes 
more questions to types of expenditure than to sources of income (Bhalla, 2001; Deaton, 2003).  Because 
household survey estimates of income generally understate national accounts estimates of income, the 
surveys also tend to imply lower average savings rates than those derived from national accounts.  
 
Expenditures on consumer durables and housing are underestimated in household surveys by a 
larger proportion than other consumption items, understating this form of savings which is especially 
important among young families (Bhalla. 2001).  Such a systematic pattern of under-enumeration of 
savings in the form of consumer durables in surveys might tend to understate the life cycle swing in 
savings as hypothesized by life cycle savings model. 
 
Survey measures of savings may not capture the same share of total savings for persons at different 
ages, and estimates of the relationship of savings with age in surveys may consequently be misleading.  As 
noted above, the age of the household head summarizes the household’s stage in the life cycle, but thereby 
ignores individuals who are not the household head (or spouses of the head if of similar age).  But these 
individuals who do not head their own household may nonetheless influence the household’s savings rate.  
For example, individuals who are young or elderly are less likely to be heads of their own household, 
except when they are unusually productive, or receive unusual transfers from their intergenerational family 
to support living separately (Schultz, 1999). 
  
 In conclusion, efforts to analyze savings in household surveys by the age of household head 
should incorporate information on household composition to try and correct the bias arising from 
sample selection, and the relative under-enumeration of savings embodied in consumer durables.  The 
omission of some non-household business savings and government savings (or dissavings) could lead 
to a different level of savings derived from household surveys than national accounts.  However, 
research has not shown how this would distort the life cycle pattern of savings in household surveys. 
 
 
4. Aggregate Evidence in Asia of the Association between Age Composition and Savings 
Higgins and Williamson (HW)(1996, 1997) estimate the relationship between a country=s age 




suggests policies which facilitated the demographic transition by lowering fertility rates were responsible for 
opening a Awindow of economic opportunity@ and yielding a Ademographic dividend@ driven by the changing 
age composition of the population, which is causally related to increasing savings rates and economic growth 
rates (Bloom and Williamson, 1998; Birdsall, et al. 2001; Mason, 2001).  This study by HW is therefore the 
starting point for my empirical reassessment of the aggregate evidence of the life cycle hypothesis to account 
for rates of savings within Asian countries.  HW estimate the relationship for 16 Asian countries from about 
1950 to 1992, using  IMF data on savings rates, and Penn World Table (PWT) data on income and prices, and 
demographic data from United Nations database, in the following form: 
S S P G RPI Dti t i a ati
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,       (1) 
t = 1950, 1951, ... , 1992;      i = 1, 2, ... , 16,   
 
where S ti   is the ratio of domestic national savings to GDP in nominal terms in year t for country i ; P ati   is the 
proportion of the population in age group a (in which a=1 for ages 0-4, =2 for ages 5-9, ... , =14 for ages 70-74, 
=15 for ages 75 or more) in year t for country i ; G ti is annual growth in real GDP in percent from the base of 
last year, which is expected to raise savings ;  RPI ti is the relative price of investment good which should 
encourage savings (and discourage investment) following DeLong and Summers (1991) drawn from PWT;  D i 
are dummy variables equal to one for each country i and zero otherwise, which control for country fixed-effects 
and capture the effect of time-invariant factors in each country, which would lead to bias if the omitted country 
factors were correlated with included explanatory variables;   ε ti   is the error in the observed savings rate, due 
to mis-measurement or approximation in function form, and this error is assumed by HW to be uncorrelated 
with all of the exogenous explanatory variables. 
 
The unbalanced panel estimates of HW are restricted in other ways.  They plausibly assume that 
economic growth and the relative prices of investment goods are endogenous, and use instrumental variables to 
estimate their coefficients in a model of savings, where the instruments are lagged explanatory variables and a 
variety of other current and lagged variables.8   Without a strong argument for imposing cross-equation 
restriction between a savings equation and an investment equation, I report here only their single-equation 
                                                           
8 The instruments include a constant, country dummies Ds, contemporary values of Z1 and Z2 (or Age1 (youth) and Age2 
(elderly)), growth of labor force, lagged values of the following: savings rate, investment rate, growth rate, RPI, and growth times Z1, 
growth times Z2 (or growth times age1 and age2), real gross product per worker in purchasing power parity (PPP) units, real gross 
product per capita in PPP, openness of the economy defined as exports plus imports as a share of GDP based on national account data, 
and lagged openness. To improve the explanatory power of the instruments in the first-stage equations, I tried to add a third year of 
lagged values for growth, RPI, and openness, which improved their joint significance (Bound, et al 1995) without affecting notably the 
IV point estimates or my conclusions. I also estimated jointly the savings and investment rates.  Few changes in the estimated effects of 
the lagged savings rate or the age composition are notable.  This paper presents therefore only the more transparently  justified single-




estimates for savings.9 
 
Empirical Specification of the Effect of Age Composition on Savings 
There are several issues in estimating the effect of a country=s age composition on its savings rate in 
equation (1).  First, because the age composition tends to vary smoothly across ages within a population, the 
values of P ati   will be highly correlated across ages, increasing the likelihood that the estimates of the joint 
effects of specific age classes will be poorly defined due to the multicollinearity.  Leff (1969) summarized the 
age distribution parsimoniously in two parameters by distinguishing three age classes as key to test his 
hypotheses: the savings effect of a youth dependent class age 0 to 14, and that of an elderly dependent class age 
65 or more, thus omitting the labor force aged class age 15 to 64 which are implicitly recovered from the 
constant term. Modigliani (1970) considers 31 industrialized and Latin American countries and reports the ratio 
of retired plus youth to working ages. Kelley and Schmidt (1996) included in their preferred AMason@ 
specification only a single age composition variable for the ratio of youth (age 0-14) to labor force ages (15-64). 
 Bloom, Canning and Graham (2002) modify slightly the age classification of Leff and include the proportion of 
the population age 0 to 19 (youth) and age 60 and over (elderly) and conclude this specification of the age 
composition fits their data better than the alternatives.  HW adopt a polynomial distribution (using two 
parameters for a quadratic) approximation as employed by Fair and Dominguez (1991), which smooths the 
estimated effect of many five year age groups on macro econometric time series estimates analogous to 
Almond’s (1965) method for estimating flexibly distributed lags.  However, Fair (1994) subsequently rejects 
this polynomial parameterization of the age composition as inadequate for his requirements, because it tends to 
force extreme values on the implied weights it assigns to the lowest and highest age groups, and he adopts 
instead normalized proportions of the population in fewer age classes.10  No study, to my knowledge, addresses 
the challenge of how to treat age composition as a function of lagged endogenous fertility.  
 
                                                           
9 The simultaneous estimation of savings and investment has some intuitive appeal, but no additional general equilibrium 
information is used to motivate the parallel estimates, and presumably to simplify the interpretation of long run responses, HW further 
restrict the coefficient on the lagged savings and lagged investment to be equal, which is reported as  .809 (t=40.3) (1996, Table 6), 
whereas in their single-equation unrestricted equations the estimates are , .816 for savings and .824 for investment (1996, Table 7).  In 
general the system and single-equation savings estimates are quite similar.  
10  However, whether one adopts the polynomial or discrete age classes in the population to represent distinctive savings 
behavior, the age variables are highly correlated, and clearly they can only be evaluated jointly. The polynomial quadratic variables 
called by HW Z1 and Z2 are correlated at   -.995 in the Asian sample analyzed here, whereas the Bloom et al (2002) three way age 
classification leads to the young and elderly proportion variables being correlated in this sample at -.861 . In first-differenced form, the 
correlation between the dZ1 and dZ2 increases to -.997, and for the young/elderly classes d0-19 and d60+ increases to -.921 .  I 
therefore reestimate the model with age classes for the youth and elderly following Bloom and Leff, to facilitate comparisons and test 
the robustness of the model=s alternative specifications of the age composition. HW (1997: Figure 1 notes) report the age shares are 
expressed in logarithms, but in personal communication with Higgins, he was certain that the estimates were not based on logged age 




Estimation of Dynamic Aggregate Relationships  
A second problem for estimating the savings equation (1) as proposed by HW is the inclusion of a 
lagged dependent variable, in this case the savings rate from the previous year, S t-1,i .  Savings rates for 
individuals are expected to gradually adapt to new prevailing conditions, and may not achieve new equilibrium 
values in precisely a year.  The temporal spilling over into the next time period of these adjustments implies that 
whatever “errors” are present in the savings equation in one year will not be independent of the error in savings 
in the prior (or following) years.  In such a dynamic behavioral relationship it is unrealistic to assume a lagged 
dependent variable is exogenous or uncorrelated with the contemporaneous error (Nerlove, 1971).  HW 
concludes that the income growth rate, G, and investment prices, RPI, are endogenous and they therefore use 
instrumental variables to estimate them.   But they treat the lagged savings and investment rates as if they were 
exogenous.11  This estimation strategy of HW (X-1) is likely to lead  to biased estimates of β1  and the other 
parameters, but is replicated here as a benchmark.  My second estimates (E-1) therefore treats the lagged 
savings rate as endogenous. The third specification of model omits the lagged savings rate (N-1), and estimates 
the same model but in a static form in which savings is assumed to achieve its long run equilibrium value in 
each period (Cf. Higgins, 1998).  A fourth specification assumes a behavioral partial adjustment process and 
estimates a panel model in first differences (FD-1), which eliminates bias arising from dynamic autoregressive 
components (Baltagi, 1995; Wooldridge, 2002). 
 
Linear and Quadratic Time Trends in the Pooled Sample and Specific to Countries 
The objective in equation (1) is to estimate the relationship between savings and age composition, both 
of which variables are trended over time, as illustrated in Figures 2 in various Asian countries.  The age 
composition in a closed population is determined by the historic path followed by crude birth and age-specific 
death rates.  Coale (1972) used stable population methods and demographic simulations of  populations to show 
how the age-specific structure of the decline in death rates affects the age composition.  At the start of the 
demographic transition the declines in mortality are proportionately largest for infants and young children, and 
the share of the population under age 16 gradually increases.  As shown in Figures 2, these shares of youth may 
rise from about 40 to as much as 45 percent in countries, as seen in Korea and Malaysia. Then as birth rates 
                                                           
11 Higgins (1998) analyzes savings, investment, and the current account balance across a world sample of 100 countries.  
There are five notable differences in his model specification from that reported by HW(1997).  First, he does not include a lagged 
dependent variable, implicitly assuming that in five years the adjustment in savings and investment is complete. Second, he treats RPI 
and G as exogenous, indicating that it does not change his estimates, which suggests using as instruments the lagged values of RPI and 
G does not adequately deal with endogeneity, a worrisome feature of the HW identification strategy.  Third,  five year averages are 
analyzed to smooth the volatility in savings and investment rates and dampen errors and shocks of a short-term nature.  Fourth, a cubic 
polynomial approximation for the age composition is specified, rather than a quadratic. He also contrasts the estimates based on within 
country estimates (i.e. country fixed effects as in HW 1996) and between country estimates, which interestingly are qualitatively 





decline, this youth share falls to 25 percent or less.  The rise in the dependency burden associated with the onset 
of the demographic transition and rapid population growth is a transitory burden, followed by a prolonged 
period of relief (Schultz, 1971).12 The initial declines in child mortality and then in fertility tend to proceed 
irreversibly once they have become established trends, unless new diseases emerge such as HIV/AIDS or 
dislocating events ensue, such as civil conflict or famine (National Research Council, 2000).13   But the 
mortality and fertility transitions start at different times in different regions and countries, presumably because 
of differences in initial conditions: institutions, policies, changes in market prices, other environmental 
conditions and developments (Figure 1).14  To attribute confidently a change in savings behavior to another 
socioeconomic trend such as age composition, it is necessary to show that the bivariate relationship is not due to 
other  development trends.  In the case of panel data, where the analysis focuses on explaining changes within 
each aggregate population, controls should include trends specific to each country.  In other words, as a check 
on the reliability of time series estimates reported by HW, overall time trends and country-specific time trends 
in linear and quadratic form are added to the savings equation, to confirm that deviations from such trends in 
savings and age composition are actually behind the estimated relationship reported by HW.  If these trends 
explain the savings association and alter substantially the apparent effects of age composition on savings, the 
HW specification may be prudently rejected. 
 
5.         New Estimates of Savings Rates for Asian Countries 
Table 1 presents the means and standard deviations of the key variables for the sample of 16 Asian 
countries for which there is sufficient data to estimate a savings equation for any of the years 1952 to 1992.  I 
could reconstruct the necessary data for 480 observations in contrast to the HW sample reported of 458.15  
                                                           
12 A second wave of health improvements has more recently reduced death rates in high-income countries, and this time 
disproportionately reducing deaths among persons over age 50. These health gains accelerate the growth in the elderly share of the 
population.  
13 More recently the transition in Russia has been associated with a rise in male adult mortality, and the HIV/AIDS epidemic 
in Africa is contributing to a decline in life expectancy which is due primarily to a rise in middle-age mortality. 
14   It may some day be possible to identify specific preconditions in a country (climate and endemic diseases) under which the 
introduction of a new public health technology (e.g. DDT) makes a large exogenous improvement in child or adult survival (Bloom and 
Williamson, 1998: Figure 3).  To use this information to explain the exogenous timing, pace and age composition of the mortality 
decline could provide a basis for predicting mortality trends.  Forecasting how fertility responds to household and community 
developments might also suggest instrumental variables predict the time series in fertility.  But to use these demographic prediction 
models to identify the effect of age composition on savings, it would also be necessary to argue that these preconditions determining 
mortality and fertility do not themselves affect the propensity to save.  
15  When I was unable to replicate the sample size or the HW age estimates, I asked Williamson for a description of their data 
or a copy, and learned from Higgins that the only copy of the data had been destroyed on September 11, 2001 on Higgins= PC in his 
Merrill Lynch office in the New York International Trade Center. Higgins could not identify the country-year observations which were 
used in the published estimates. My sample includes Bangladesh 1976-1992; China 1981-1992; Hong Kong 1966-1992; India 1952-
1992; Indonesia 1966-1992; Japan 1956-1992; Korea 1955-1991; Malaysia 1957-1992; Myanmar 1962-1968, 1975-1989; Nepal 1976-




Column (1) of Table 2 reproduces the original estimates of Higgins and Williamson (1996: Table 7).  Column 
(2) is a replication of their single-equation IV estimates based on their description of their sample, data sources, 
and statistical methods.  Their most controversial assumption, in my view, is that the unexplained error in the 
current year=s savings rates is uncorrelated with the savings rates in the previous year.  In other words, they 
assume that the lagged savings variable can be treated as exogenous to current savings.  With the inclusion of 
country-specific fixed-effects, the Pseudo R square is .94 according to HW, and .91 in my replication.  The 
coefficient on the lagged savings rate is smaller in the replication, .77 compared with .82 , but many times its 
standard error.16  The coefficients on the growth rate are not significantly different from zero.  The coefficient 
estimated on the relative price of investment goods (RPI) is not significant in the replication and a third of the 
magnitude of the HW estimate.  The only estimates HW discuss are the two coefficients on the quadratic 
polynomial approximation for the effect of the age composition on savings, which are jointly significant 
according to my estimates (F(2,459)= 13.4) and those reported by HW (F(2,439) = 10.7). The implied short-run 
association of saving with the five-year age proportions of the population rise and fall with advancing ages as 
anticipated in the LC model.  However, the magnitude of my estimated effects of the age composition 
polynomials on savings are roughly one-third the magnitude  HW report.  When combined with the smaller 
coefficient on the lagged savings rate, the implied long-run adjustment in savings to the age composition 
polynomials are four times larger according to HW than in my replication.17 
 
When an overall linear or quadratic time trend is added (X-2, X-3), the estimates of Z1 and Z2 remain 
significant and of roughly the same magnitude in columns (3) and (4) of Table 2.  However, when country-
                                                                                                                                                                                                       
1952-1992. Thus, I am unable to determine how my sample differs from theirs.  I also estimated their joint constrained system of 
savings and investment rates (1996, Table 6), and my estimates of the coefficients on the age polynomial decreased as shown in the 
single-equation estimates reported in column (2) of my Table 2. One of HW instruments is RGDPW (Real Gross Domestic Product per  
Worker), which they indicate is from PWT.  But the series stops in PWT in 1998, which left me with a sample size of 433 in my first  
estimates. Labor force growth from 1989 to 1992 is therefore drawn from the World Bank Development Indicators  to complete the 
series for RGDPW for most countries. 
16 Fry and Mason (1982), Mason (1987), and Kelley and Schmidt (1996) include in their model interactions between income 
growth and the age composition. HW do not adopt this specification because, they argue, it is derived from a steady-state growth model 
and ignores the important disequilibrium consequences of changing age compositions.  Including in my estimates interactions between 
G and age composition polynomials or age classes was not a general improvement, although I followed HW and included the 
interactions in the list of instruments. 
17 One reason for specifying models of demand or supply with a lagged dependent variable is that technical and institutional 
rigidities are expected to delay full adjustment and temporally distribute the adjustment in an exponentially lagged form (Koyck, 1954; 
Almond, 1965; Balestra and Nerlove, 1966).  In such a framework the short run effect of a change in the age composition on savings is 
represented in equation (1) by β2 , whereas in the long run the feedback each period transmitted through the lagged dependent variable 
accumulates until the long run effect of age composition on saving reaches β2 /(1- β1 ).  HW estimates in Table 2 imply a .01 decrease 
in the share of children age 0-4 (average in sample .13) and an offsetting increase in the share of persons age 15-19 (or 60-64) who 
appear to have a relatively neutral effect on savings would be associated with a .011 increase in the proportion of income saved in the 
following year (short run)(See figure 3). This effect would gradually increase 5.4 fold in the long run (i.e., β2 /(1-.816)), and according 
to the HW estimates, the long run effect on savings would be about .060.  My replication estimate suggests a much smaller impact on 




specific linear trends are included, these country-specific trend parameters are themselves highly significant 
(F(16,443) = 4.99, p< .0000), and the estimated long term effect of the age composition on savings decreases by 
another two-thirds.   Are other linear trended variables within these developing Asian countries accounting for 
the broad trends in savings rates, or is it reasonable to attribute these trends only to changes in age composition, 
as concluded in the papers on the Ademographic dividend@ (Bloom and Williamson, 1998; Birdsall, et al, 2001; 
Mason, 2001)?  If not, the estimated long run effects of the age composition controlling for country-specific 
trends are only about one-tenth the magnitude of those extrapolated by HW in their simulations. 
 
Based on the instruments listed in HW to identify the savings effects of growth and investment prices, 
the Durbin-Wu-Hausman specification test rejects the hypothesis that the lagged savings rate is exogenous at a 
1 percent confidence level reported at the bottom of column 1 of Table 3.   The preferred specification is thus 
estimated in Table 3 that treat the lagged savings rate as endogenous (E-1) without trends in the first column of 
Table 3.  In this case, the estimated coefficients on Z1 and Z2 are no longer jointly statistically different from 
zero, and the magnitude of the imprecise point estimates are about one-third of those in the replicated model in 
which lagged savings is assumed exogenous (X-1 in Table 2).  Figure 3 visually contrasts the implied estimates 
of the age polynomial for the 15 age groups across specifications.  The age group estimates (diamonds) reported 
by Higgins and Williamson (1996, Figure 1), are compared with the replication estimates (squares) with the 
lagged dependent variable (LDV) treated as exogenous, and finally with the preferred estimates (triangles) 
where the LDV are treated as endogenous, excluding any time trends. 
 
If the endogenous lagged savings estimates do not provide convincing evidence of dynamic adjustment 
behavior, this may explain why Higgins (1998) estimated a static model of savings, in which he omits 
altogether the lagged savings rate.  Estimates of this static specification are reported in columns (7), (8), and (9) 
in Table 2.   When no time trends is specified in column (7) (N-1), the age composition polynomial coefficients 
are jointly significant, and the savings effects of age are of approximately the same magnitude as the long-term 
effects derived from the exogenous lagged savings estimates in column (2) in Table 2 (X-1).  Including 
quadratic country specific trends in column (9) (N-5) decreases the age composition effects by about the same 
two-thirds as in the LDV exogenous specification (X-5).  Again, the evidence is that if flexible time trends in 
savings are allowed to vary by country, the age composition exerts little effect on savings.   
 
The final strategy for estimating a dynamic adjustment model from panel data involves taking first 
differences of all of the variables, or their changes over time, to purge the estimates of bias caused by 




in the lagged variables as instruments for the endogenous growth, RPI and lagged savings.18 The estimates of 
this first-differenced (FD) model are reported in Table 4, which is analogous to that estimated in Tables 2 and 3. 
If trends in savings are ignored as in (E-1) the first differences (FD-1) require that the constant term be 
suppressed.  Including the constant term in (FD-2) implicitly allows for an overall linear time trend in the 
savings.  Correspondingly, (FD-3) includes a quadratic overall trend, and (FD-4) and (FD-5) include the 
country-specific linear and quadratic trends.  When the effect on saving of lagged savings is purged of the 
possible correlation between the savings error and the individual country fixed effects, there remains no 
significant association between the age composition and current savings (F(2,464=.43 in column 1 Table 4), 
with or without trends. 
 
Perhaps the age polynomial is not summarizing adequately the effect of the age composition on savings, 
as argued by Fair (1994).  The more straightforward measures of the proportion of the population who are 
youth-- age 0-19 -- and elderly -- age 60 or over -- could better represent the savings effect of these two 
dependent age groups.19  Estimates of this specification of the savings equation are reported in Table 5 in which 
lagged savings is first treated as exogenous, and then it is treated as endogenous with different time trends in 
what is my preferred specifications.  The first column (X-1) is based on the HW assumption that lagged savings 
is exogenous, which is rejected again by the Hausman specification test (not reported).  The two age class 
variables are in this case significant at the .02 percent level, and they explain marginally less of the variation in 
savings than the quadratic polynomial, with the Pseudo R squared adjusted for degrees of freedom being .903 in 
Table 5, compared with .910 in Table 2.  A decrease in the youth share by .01 is associated with an increase in 
savings by .0024 , and a comparable decrease in the smaller elderly share (Cf. Table 1) is associated with an 
increase in savings by .0044 .  When lagged savings is estimated as endogenous in the second column of Table 
5 the short run effect drops to less than half it prior value, the "adjustment@ coefficient on lagged savings is .95 
implying a very long adjustment of savings, but the age-category variables are not jointly statistically 
significant.  Adding overall time trends or country-specific trends does not improve the significance of the age 
composition variables.  Changing  the representation of the age composition from the quadratic polynomial 
approximation to the two dependent age groups does not alter in any fundamental way these findings.  The 
Hausman specification tests rejects the exogeneity of savings given the HW instruments, and if savings are thus 
                                                           
18 For the early use of panel data see Balestra and Nerlove (1966), the exploration of general estimation approaches by 
Nerlove (1971), and more recent methods for dealing with these problems by Baltagi (1995) and Wooldridge (2002).  
19 Estimates were also obtained considering the ages 0 to 14 and 65 and over, which were somewhat less significant jointly 
than the larger dependent group variables reported in Table 5. No notable changes in conclusions were noted from these alternative age 
groups, or for that matter when a third category of prime saving age is included, or when the youth and elderly are expressed as a 




viewed as endogenous, there  is no statistical reason to conclude from these aggregate estimates that the age 
composition is significantly related to the aggregate savings rates within Asian countries. 
 
6.     Directions for Future Empirical Research on Savings and the Demographic Transition 
To understand how changes in the age composition of Asian countries might affect savings and growth 
opportunities, I would propose several directions for further research: (1) reexamine aggregate relationships 
between the demographic transition and savings, in which the age composition is endogenous and estimated 
with suitable instrumental variables which are outside the control of the family and which are likely to have 
affected past trends in fertility as well as child mortality; (2) analyze individual, household, and inter-
generational family data to describe causal mechanisms  linking the family’s lifetime environment to fertility, 
time allocation, human capital investments, and physical savings over a lifetime; (3) expand the sample of 
countries analyzed beyond Asia, and include the preconditions and institutional settings which may affect the 
incentives for families to have children and to accumulate physical wealth; and (4) if older populations demand 
more pensions and medical care, consider how these expenditures can be supported by non-distortionary taxes 
and household resources, to avoid running public deficits which could crowd-out productive investments. 
 
The first direction for research would reexamine aggregate panel data for countries, but extend the 
analysis to account for the timing and speed of the demographic transition and thereby treat the age composition 
as if it were dependent on family lifetime behavior.  A country=s current age composition is a reflection of past 
family fertility decisions, which are coordinated with the allocation of mother’s time, the allocation of resources 
to child health and schooling, and savings in the form of physical assets.  Higgins and Williamson (1996) 
specify instruments to predict growth and relative prices which are arguably endogenous to family life cycle 
behavior, such as labor force participation, the age composition, and lagged savings.  Selecting the instruments 
to determine birth and death rates might refocus analysis on the policy interventions and institutions that have 
governed the timing of the demographic transition in different countries. For example, the historic path of child 
mortality might be partly explained by when public health programs in a country adopt new technologies, such 
as vaccination programs and family planning methods, and the effectiveness of these interventions in the 
context of the local climate with its specific endemic disease vectors.   But these public sector interventions are 
only part of the process.  The health management capacity of families should also be considered, and the most 
readily distinguished factor affecting the health of children is the education of mothers, as well as the income 
opportunities and inequalities between families, the relative price of foodstuff and volatility of these prices, 
urban transmission of communicable diseases, public and private health services in rural and urban areas, and 





           Declines in fertility are linked at the family and aggregate levels to the increasing schooling of young 
women, as well as the increasing local employment opportunities for women outside of the home, access to 
reliable birth control, and the empowerment of women measured by their education, employment, and assets 
relative to that of men in society, and women=s property rights to dispose of their assets, to use them as 
collateral for credit, and to share in family inheritance.  The increasing labor force participation of women 
outside of the home, which is evident in many parts of the world, is closely associated to the decline in fertility. 
Women=s entry into work outside of the home, however, is not a necessary consequence of fertility decline; 
cultural and labor market institutions influence when women are drawn into the labor force, what types of jobs 
they occupy, and whether they compete with or supplement male workers.  All of these local conditions and 
labor market institutions also affect fertility and probably strengthen the capacity of governments or NGOs to 
deliver family planning methods directly to women.  These gender related social developments differ not only 
across Eastern Asia between Japan, Korea, and Taiwan and Singapore, but even more notably across South 
Asia from Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, India, Pakistan, to Nepal. 
 
A second direction for research would be to model explicitly fertility as a life cycle choice, and estimate 
how the decline in fertility is determined within and across birth cohorts, and how policy induced changes in 
child mortality and fertility are associated with savings and asset accumulations at the individual level.   
Following birth cohorts over time in repeated cross sectional surveys, it should be possible to decompose 
change in aggregate outcomes for a cohort into change due to micro determinants.  This approach could test the 
predictions of micro behavioral models only if the determinants of fertility, child mortality, and savings are 
specified in terms of variables that are beyond the control of families or exogenous.  As hypothesized earlier, 
different causes for the decline in fertility are likely to have different “cross-effects” on household savings, and 
the schooling and health of children, as well as the capacity of children to migrate to regions where employment 
opportunities are better.20  In other words, unless one is able to distinguish (i.e. identify) the background causes 
for the fertility decline, it is hard to test the validity of life cycle saving hypothesis and assess whether it “adds 
up” to the “demographic dividend” or is due to other unobserved factors. More family level research on these 
issues is needed, guided by the distinction between exogenous constraints on the family and of endogenous 
lifetime choices by the family (Schultz, 1981). Understanding the causes for fertility decline, and the 
                                                           
20 Hammer (1986) estimated parallel reduced-form equations for household fertility and savings, recognizing they were 
likely to be coordinated family behaviors, and documented opposite effects of household constraints on the two outcomes.  Mason 
(1987: pp.539-540) concludes upon reviewing the evidence from aggregate country studies of the demographic dividend model:@ 
by failing to model explicitly the Ainstruments@ by which fertility and, hence, the dependency ratio change, the model estimated 
above has limited policy applications.  On theoretical grounds, the effect of reduced fertility on aggregate saving ratio should vary 
depending on the means by which a fertility reduction is achieved: fertility decline accomplished via non price policies 
unambiguously reduces the share devoted to childrearing and increases aggregate saving; fertility decline induced via price 




simultaneous child mortality decline, that are outside of the family=s control, should also help in evaluating how 
public health initiatives, family planning programs, childhood immunization campaigns, reproductive health 
programs, and other specific reproductive and child health policies have each contributed   to improve the well 
being of individuals. 
  
A third direction for research would be to extend the analysis beyond Asia.  Asia is an attractive initial 
setting for such studies, because the decline in child mortality and fertility starts first in North East Asia, 
follows in South East Asia, and occurs more gradually in Central and West Asia as seen in Figure 1. I would be 
surprised if Asian patterns of savings and growth emerge in sub-Saharan Africa, because the region=s fertility is 
only beginning to decline, and because other conditions in the African region are unfavorable for growth, 
including civil conflict, refugee movements, and the HIV/AIDS epidemic.  But Latin America presents an 
interesting puzzle and challenge to the hypothesized “demographic dividend@, and its distinctive behavior 
should be a focus of more research.  A more comprehensive micro theory of household savings than the life-
cycle hypothesis might help to account for Latin America.  Specifically, why did the early fertility decline in 
Latin America fail to trigger an increase in private savings (Ahlburg, 2002)? Were financial institutions 
repressed or geared to serve primarily upper income classes in Latin America, where credit markets were often 
distorted by inflation and government regulations?  Did the poor in Latin America enjoy fewer opportunities to 
invest in the schooling of their children, or were the private wage returns from such schooling demonstrably 
lower than those enjoyed by the poor in Asia? Did the protection from international trade in Latin America 
restrict the growth of export-oriented industries, industries which in Asia provided employment opportunities 
for many women.  In other words, what conditions in Latin America made it less advantageous for parents, as 
they voluntarily restricted their fertility starting in the 1960s, to substitute physical savings and human capital 
investments for number of children?  I have not seen empirical evidence to explain the experience of Latin 
America.  
 
7.         Have We Made Progress: Tentative Conclusions 
The partial association between savings and the quadratic polynomial approximation for the age 
structure appears to be statistically significant when conditioned on lagged savings, if this lagged dependent 
variable is treated as exogenous.  But this treatment of a lagged dependent variable as exogenous in an adaptive 
behavioral model of savings is implausible, both conceptually in a macro economic model, and empirically 
according to a Hausman test of exogeneity reported in Table 3. The long-run effect of the age composition on 
savings, under the hypothetical assumption that it is exogenous, is a fourth the magnitude reported by Higgins 
and Williamson (HW,1996, 1997). Instead of attributing a third of the increase in Asian savings and growth in 




for a tenth of the rise in Asian savings rates, according to their calculations.  When linear time trends are 
introduced, which are allowed to vary for each country, the estimated effect of the age composition on savings 
is reduced by another two-thirds. But as noted, conceptual and empirical evidence suggests the need to 
reestimate the dynamic savings model and treat lagged savings as an endogenous variable, identified by the HW 
instruments (E-1, Table 3).  The joint effects of the age composition parameters are then statistically 
insignificant, whether approximated by the quadratic polynomial function used by HW, or the three age classes 
in Table 5 as used by Bloom et al (2002).   Including time trends specific to each country, a common practice in 
panel data studies to check the robustness of estimates, the age composition has unstable and imprecise effects 
on savings.  Finally, if the model is estimated in first differences to remove bias from dynamic autoregressive 
components, the age composition effects on savings appear to be statistically insignificant.  
 
There is a time trend in the glacial evolution of the age composition within these 16 Asian countries 
from 1950 to 1992 which is superficially related to the time trend in increasing savings rates (Figures 2). 
Implementing a variety of econometric methods to estimate the dynamic effect of age composition on aggregate 
savings does not uncover stable empirical support for the conclusion that the secular rise in savings in these 
countries during this period depends on the increase in the proportion of these populations entering the prime 
working ages of 20 to 59 when savings is expected to be higher than average.  
 
Learning From Chinese Experience 
Modigliani crystalized the implications of savings as a life cycle behavior fifty years ago, and his recent 
study of Chinese savings illustrates again the intuitive appeal and statistical limitations of this framework to fit 
aggregate time series (Modigliani and Cao, 2004).  The Asian sample of countries which HW study and I have 
analyzed in this paper is based on IMF saving data published by 1995, and therefore only includes observations 
for China for 1981 to 1992.  Modigliani and Cao (2004) have estimated Chinese savings data for 1953 to 2000, 
when savings out of disposable income increased from 5 to 35 percent from 1975 to1995. They account for 
most of the annual variation in savings by regressing it on two variables suggested by the life cycle model:  
long-term income growth (over the last 15 years), and the ratio of dependent youth to employed workers. Their 
evidence warrants a skeptical evaluation.  Others have not found the expected life cycle pattern in household 
savings within other Asian or high-income countries (Browning and Lusardi, 1996; Deaton and Paxson, 1997; 
Schultz, 1998).  Household studies of  savings behavior for China are now needed to advance  Modigliani’s 
interpretation of the time series aggregate association. 
 
 Modigliani and Cao (2004, p. 151) also see the implications of the household demand model, as they 




measures came into effect in the 1970s (i.e., one-child family population policy in China) the accumulation of 
life cycle (tangible) assets gains in importance as a substitute for children.@ If children and savings are 
substitutes, the life cycle savings framework should incorporate the household demand for children and other 
assets to explain more comprehensively savings behavior. To test this more comprehensive model of household 
lifetime savings and the demographic transition, data are needed for intergenerational families that survey both 
generations, to document transfers in both directions and savings and reproduction. Inter-generational transfers 
and exchanges are potentially important and a neglected aspect of consumption-smoothing behavior in poor 
countries. The association within countries over time of savings and age composition is suggestive of a causal 
relationship, but is not firm evidence of a relationship which can be extrapolated beyond the period observed 
into a future, older Asia, or for that matter extended to developments unfolding in other regions of the world, 
such as Africa. 
 
Two influential economic models have assumed population growth and structure are driving forces in 
development. Malthus postulated that natural propensities toward population growth would neutralize any real 
wage gains accruing to the working class in the long run.  His insights have structured our thinking about the 
industrial revolution for two centuries, and reinforced a pessimistic view of the consequences of the 
demographic transition in the low-income world, especially in China and India (Coale and Hoover, 1958).  
Modigliani’s life cycle savings hypothesis is also emerging today as a forecasting tool which implies savings 
will decline as a country ages, slowing its potential for economic growth. However, both frameworks neglect 
the adaptive capacity of economic and social institutions in a changing world, including most centrally the role 
of the family to reallocate resources, and to coordinate lifetime behavior and living arrangements to improve the 
well being of its members.  As life becomes healthier and longer, women become better educated and more 
productive, and fertility declines, the behavior of the family will probably adapt to the changing age 
composition of its membership to realize the gains and distribute the burdens. How this will impact the 
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  a Means are shown and standard deviation is  
























































































































































































































































































































Joint Significance of F 



















































































  Table 3 :      Estimates of Savings Model with Lagged Savings Endogenous 
 
 





























































































































































Hausman Test for the 
Rejection of Exogeneity of 
Lagged Savings 

















Joint Significance of F 

















































Table 4:   Estimates of Savings Model with Endogenous Lagged Savings Using First Differences* 
 
 






































































































































































Joint Significance of F 
Test 












































*Absolute value of robust t statistic reported in parenthesis beneath coefficients.  Sample size is 469 




   

















































































































































































































































*Robust standards errors and absolute values of t statistics reported beneath regression coefficients 



















































Figures 2.  Youth and Elderly Proportions of Population and Share  














































































































































































































































Fig. 3  Alternative Estimates of Quadratic Polynomial of Age Effects on 
Savings Proportion 
 
Sources:  Higgins and Williamson, 1996, Table 7 (Table 2, Col. 1)  
                Exogenous Lagged Dependent Variable (Table 2 , Col. 2) , with no time trends 
         Endogenous Lagged Dependent Variable (Table 3, Col. 1), with no time trends 
 
